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Abstract
This article presents a critique of Paulo Freire's philosophical perspective on human 
nature in the context of a doctoral research study to explore “muchness” or nurses’ 
subjective	experience	of	well-being;	and	demonstrates	how	this	critique	has	informed	
the refinement of the theoretical principles used to inform research methodology and 
methods.	Engaging	in	philosophical	groundwork	is	essential	for	research	coherence	
and	integrity.	Through	this	groundwork,	largely	informed	by	Freire's	critical	pedagogy	
and	his	 ideas	on	humanization,	 I	 recognized	 the	need	 to	clarify	my	understanding	
of the concepts of persons and personhood and how this related to Freire's use of 
the term human beings. This clarification process is essential to ensure congruence 
between	the	theoretical	principles	that	I	draw	from	his	work	and	my	beliefs	about	
persons,	personhood	and	person-centredness.	The	article	begins	with	a	brief	intro-
duction	to	the	research,	followed	by	an	overview	of	Freire's	philosophical	perspec-
tives,	and	subsequently,	the	critique	process	is	presented	and	discussed.	This	process	
involved engaging with the vast literature and debates about what it means to be a 
person,	to	make	sense	of	the	often	complex	and	contradictory	arguments.	Eventually,	
three headings emerged that helped me to frame my evolving understanding: Our 
species: human beings; The kind that we are: human nature; and This person that I am: 
personhood.	Through	this	process	of	exploration,	I	recognized	that	Freire's	perspec-
tive	on	human	nature	(a)	foregrounded	cognitive	rationality,	which	presented	itself	
as	a	limitation	when	considering	my	ontological	beliefs	and	the	focus	of	my	research,	
leading	me	to	draw	on	the	work	of	Mark	Johnson	and	his	ideas	about	embodiment	to	
help me to further develop my theoretical principles; (b) focused on the “collective” 
rather	than	individuals,	which	is	a	shortcoming	in	relation	to	person-centred	research	
that	acknowledges	the	uniqueness	of	participants.
K E Y W O R D S
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1  | INTRODUC TION
This article presents a critique of Paulo Freire's philosophical per-
spective on human nature in the context of a doctoral research 
study to explore “muchness” or nurses’ subjective experience of 
well-being.	 I	was	 initially	 drawn	 to	 Freire's	 idea	 of	 conscientiza-
tion,	a	process	through	which	people	(individually	and	collectively)	
are	 empowered	 by	 constructing	 and	 using	 their	 own	 knowledge	
of	reality,	thereby	identifying	how	it	can	be	transformed	(Reason	
&	Torbert,	2001;	Wallerstein	&	Duran,	2008).	However,	 as	 I	 im-
mersed myself further in Freire's critical and liberatory pedagogy 
and	 his	 ideas	 on	 humanization	 (Freire,	 2000),	 I	 recognized	 the	
need to explore the relationship between Freire's use of the term 
“human being” and my understanding of what is a “person.” This 
is important because on a personal level and as an affiliate mem-
ber	of	a	centre	for	person-centred	research	practice,	I	believe	that	
my research should be underpinned by the values and principles 
of	 person-centredness.	 I	 therefore	 needed	 to	 clarify	 my	 under-
standing of the concepts of persons and personhood and how this 
relates	 to	Freire's	 use	of	 the	 term	human	beings,	 to	 ensure	 that	
there is a congruence between the theoretical principles that I 
have	drawn	from	his	work	to	underpin	my	research	and	my	beliefs	
about	 persons,	 personhood	 and	 person-centredness.	 I	 contend	
that developing robust theoretical principles through philosoph-
ical	groundwork	 is	 fundamental	 to	achieving	research	coherence	
and integrity as they will inform my methodologies and methods 
(Trigg,	2001).
The critique process involved engaging with the vast literature 
and	debates	about	what	it	means	to	be	a	person:	reading,	rereading	
and	writing	to	make	sense	of	the	often	complex	and	contradictory	
arguments.	Eventually,	 three	headings	emerged	 that	helped	me	 to	
frame my evolving understanding: Our species: human beings; The 
kind that we are: human nature; and This person that I am: personhood.
The	article	will	firstly	provide	a	brief	introduction	to	my	research,	
followed	by	an	overview	of	Freire's	philosophical	perspectives,	be-
fore I explore the three headings identified above. I will demonstrate 
how my understanding has evolved by sharing how my theoretical 
principles were developed and refined over time.
2  | ABOUT THE RESE ARCH
Although	change	in	health	care	is	not	new,	the	current	economic	and	
social climate means that services are under constant pressure to 
provide	high-quality	care	to	populations	with	increasingly	complex	
needs,	whilst	also	experiencing	a	squeeze	on	public	funding.	The	im-
pact	on	the	day-to-day	life	of	staff	is	not	always	a	positive	one	(Point	
of	Care	Foundation,	2014).	 I	 frequently	experience	 this	 first	hand,	
when	working	with	nurse-led	teams	in	my	role	as	a	practice	develop-
ment	 facilitator.	 Staff	 talk	 about	 feeling	 overworked,	 undervalued	
and undermined. This appears to impact on their readiness and de-
sire	 to	 develop	 themselves,	 their	 practice	 and	workplace	 cultures	
that	are	person-centred.
My	interest	in	the	concept	of	“muchness”	arises	from	these	expe-
riences	and	was	initially	stimulated	when	I	read	“Alice	in	Workland”	
by	Walsh	and	Craig	(2014).	This	blog	considered	some	quotes	from	
Alice	in	Wonderland,	to	identify	what	lessons	or	meaning	they	can	
offer health care today. One of these was as follows:
“You used to be much more ‘muchier’. You’ve lost your 
muchness,” said the Mad Hatter (to Alice).
Walsh	and	Craig	(2014)	define	muchness	as:
"Who we have become through our life journey… It’s 
what we stand for and how we offer our own self into the 
community we live in. It is about all the learning we have 
done in our whole lives, the ups and the downs, not just 
our work lives. It’s about what we choose to pay atten-
tion to and our effort to."
A	dictionary	definition	states	that	muchness	means:
“the quality or state of being in great quantity, extent, or 
degree” (Merriam Webster , n.d.)
When	reflecting	on	my	experiences	and	these	definitions,	 I	pro-
pose	 that	 some	nursing	 staff	have	 “lost	 their	muchness,”	potentially	
impacting on their ability to practise human caring in the ways that 
they	want	to.	Initial	explorations	of	muchness,	to	make	explicit	any	as-
sumptions	that	I	might	be	taking	into	the	research,	situate	it	primarily	
in	the	eudaimonic	tradition	of	well-being.	In	this	context,	muchness	is	
associated	with	“living	well,”	in	accordance	with	an	individual's	values	
and beliefs and embodied moral virtues; and having a sense of pur-
pose	and	fulfilment.	This	understanding	draws	on	not	only	the	work	
of	contemporary	philosophers	such	as	Norton	(1976)	and	May	(1969)	
(cited	in	Waterman,	2008),	but	also	the	work	of	psychologists	such	as	
Waterman	(2008)	and	Huta	(2013),	who	recognize	the	subjective	ex-
periences	of	eudaimonic	well-being.	This	exploration	made	me	ques-
tion whether current organizational approaches to the promotion of 
well-being	(Department	of	Health,	2011a,	2011b)	enable	the	develop-
ment	of	cultures	where	both	staff	and	patients	experience	person-cen-
tredness,	enabling	them	to	thrive	and	flourish.	Person-centredness	is	
defined	by	McCormack,	Manley,	and	Titchen	(2013,	p.	193)	as:
…an approach to practice established through the for-
mation and fostering of healthful relationships between 
all care providers, service users and others significant to 
them in their lives. It is underpinned by values of respect 
for persons, individual right to self-determination, mu-
tual respect and understanding. It is enabled by cultures 
of empowerment that foster continuous approaches to 
practice development.
My	 research	 therefore	 aims	 to	 explore	 the	 following	 questions:	
What	is	muchness?	How	can	muchness	be	nurtured?	And	how	does	
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muchness	 contribute	 to	person-centred	 cultures,	 specifically	 human	
flourishing?
The starting point for the research was a review of the phil-
osophical	 and	 psychological	 underpinnings	 of	well-being.	A	 vast	
amount of time and many cultural shifts have occurred since 
Aristotle	 wrote	 Nicomachean	 Ethics.	 As	 a	 result,	 this	 is	 a	 mas-
sive	 field	 of	 knowledge	 with	 multiple	 interpretations	 and	 disci-
pline-based	approaches;	some	are	complementary,	and	others	are	
conflictual.	With	this	in	mind,	my	intention	was	to	navigate	a	way	
through to identify the literature that was relevant to my research. 
Through	 this	 process,	 I	was	 able	 to	 determine	 that	muchness	 is	
situated	within	the	eudaimonic	tradition	of	well-being.	Whilst	the	
traditional	 translation	 of	 “eudaimonia”	 is	 happiness,	 some	 mod-
ern-day	philosophers	prefer	 to	 translate	 it	 as	 “flourishing”	 (Huta	
&	Waterman,	 2014,	 p.	 1,427).	 The	 concept	 of	 eudaimonia	 origi-
nally	arises	from	the	contemplations	of	Aristotle,	focusing	around	
the questions of how we should live and what constitutes a life 
well-lived.	As	such,	it	was	seen	as	objective	condition	(Waterman,	
2008),	judged	from	the	outside.	However,	in	accordance	with	the	
views	of	more	contemporary	philosophers,	who	acknowledge	sub-
jective	experiences	(Norton,	1976;	May,	1969,	cited	in	Waterman,	
2008),	I	believe	that	muchness	is	more	closely	related	to	the	sub-
jective	experience	of	well-being.	Subsequently,	I	have	worked	vir-
tually,	creatively,	and	critically	with	nurses	to	capture	“stories	of	
muchness.” We have used the process of exploration and the cre-
ation of these stories to help us to understand the concept itself 
and	how	it	can	best	be	nurtured	in	the	workplace.
3  | PAULO FREIRE:  AN OVERVIE W OF HIS 
PHILOSOPHIC AL PERSPEC TIVES
I	was	originally	drawn	to	the	work	of	Paulo	Freire	in	the	very	early	
days	of	my	doctoral	studies,	when	I	was	considering	what	my	re-
search	methodology	 and	methods	might	 look	 like.	 I	was	 imagin-
ing	enabling	nurses	to	engage	in	self-reflective	inquiry	about	their	
subjective	 experiences	 of	muchness,	 to	 facilitate	 a	 process	 that	
would	 enable	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 knowledge	 about	 much-
ness,	 raising	 consciousness	 of	 the	 practices	 and	 situations	 that	
enabled	nurses	to	experience	it	(and	those	that	prevented	it),	with	
the purpose of identifying ways in which it could be experienced 
more often. This could involve not only challenging personal con-
straints,	e.g.	the	belief	that	you	are	powerless	to	change	anything,	
but	 also	 confronting	 barriers	 within	 the	 workplace	 and	 organi-
zational culture and context that ultimately prevent nurses from 
working	 in	ways	 that	 enable	 them	 to	 experience	muchness,	 and	
ultimately to flourish. Through my exploration of the “family of 
approaches”	related	to	action	research	(Cordeiro,	Baldini	Soares,	&	
Rittenmeyer,	2017,	p.3)	and	methods	such	as	photovoice	(Catalani	
&	Minkler,	2010;	Hergenrather,	Rhodes,	&	Bardhoshi,	2009),	I	was	
intuitively drawn to Freire's idea of conscientization. This is a pro-
cess through which people (individually and collectively) are em-
powered	by	constructing	and	using	their	own	knowledge	of	reality,	
thereby	identifying	how	it	can	be	transformed	(Reason	&	Torbert,	
2001;	Wallerstein	&	Duran,	2008).
Paulo	 Freire	was	 a	 philosopher,	 educator	 and	political	 activist.	
He	was	born	in	1921	in	one	of	the	poorest	regions	of	Brazil.	From	
a	 very	 early	 age,	 he	 became	 concerned	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 pov-
erty,	struggling	to	understand	the	silence	of	the	working	classes	that	
condemned them to passivity under the oppression of a dominant 
minority	(Ledwith,	2016).	Similarly,	his	interest	in	education	appears	
to	have	started	at	an	early	age	(Taylor,	1993)	and	focused	on	helping	
adults	who	were	 illiterate	 to	 read	 and	write,	 using	 a	method	 that	
drew	on	 the	 social	 and	political	 realities	of	 the	 students.	Because	
this	approach	had	the	potential	for	political	outcomes,	he	was	scape-
goated	in	the	early	1960s,	accused	of	“bringing	the	country	to	the	
verge	of	revolution”	(Taylor,	1993,	p.	25)	by	politicizing	the	masses	
and	threatening	the	status	quo.	He	was	therefore	arrested	and	later	
exiled to Chile.
In	 addition	 to	 his	 experiences	 of	working	with	working-class	
communities,	 Freire's	 thinking	 and	 therefore	 his	 pedagogy	were	
influenced	by	his	wide	reading,	an	eclectic	mix	of	pedagogies	and	
philosophies,	creating	a	“complex	tissue”	of	woven	threads	(Taylor,	
1993,	p.	34).	Different	authors	identify	different	influences	in	his	
work.	For	example,	Ledwith	 (2016,	p.	30)	 suggests	 influences	of	
philosophers	 and	 theorists	 such	 as	 Marx,	 “Satre,	 Marcuse,	 Che	
Guevara,	 Fidel	 Castro,	Merleau-Ponty,	 the	 critical	 theory	 of	 the	
Frankfurt	 School,	 and	 African	 thinkers	 Amilcar	 Cabral,	 Frantz	
Fanon	and	Julius	Nyerere.”	Torres	(1994	p.	431),	however,	recog-
nizes	 influences	 from	 “phenomenology,	 existentialism,	 Christian	
personalism,	 humanist	 Marxism,	 and	 Hegelianism.”	 Ultimately,	
Torres	 (1994)	 argued	 that	 Freire's	 synthesis	 of	 these	philosophi-
cal	perspectives,	 leading	 to	 the	development	of	his	political	phi-
losophy	 of	 education,	 demanded	 “dialogue	 and	 ultimately	 social	
awareness as a way to overcome domination and oppression 
among	and	between	human	beings”	(p.	431).
It was during his time in prison and the years that followed in 
exile	in	Chile,	where	he	continued	to	be	involved	in	powerful	work-
ing-class	organizations,	that	Freire's	ideas	about	the	political	nature	
of education began to crystallize. Central to this philosophy is the 
intertwined	 nature	 of	 education	 and	 freedom,	 where	 education	
is seen as the means by which people can be freed from the con-
straints	of	cultural	silence	(Taylor,	1993,	p.1	citing	Reimer,	1970,	p.	
69).	 Fundamental	 to	Freire's	 theory	 is	 the	 idea	 that	human	beings	
become dehumanized when their consciousness is submerged by 
an oppressive reality. Those absorbed by this reality will remain op-
pressed,	accepting	their	circumstances	as	inevitable,	as	long	as	they	
are unaware of the causes of their oppression. The theory recog-
nizes that both learners and teachers should be seen as “subjects” in-
volved	in	the	wakening	of	a	critical	consciousness	of	reality.	Freire's	
critical pedagogy emerged as a collective and empowering process 
of learning that enables people to:
•	 Step	back	from	and	to	question	those	aspects	of	everyday	life	that	
are	so	familiar	that	they	become	taken	for	granted,	helping	us	to	
see the world in a new way
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•	 Identify	the	structures	within	society	that	act	to	disempower,	dis-
criminate	and	disadvantage	some	people,	becoming	critical	of	the	
knowledge	 that	 serves	 the	 interests	of	 the	dominant	 few	yet	 is	
“sold	to	society	as	common	sense”	(Ledwith,	2016,	p.	35)
•	 Develop	new	knowledge	and	create	new	theories	 that	will	help	
them	to	identify	what	they	would	like	to	change	and	the	actions	
they	will	take	to	achieve	this.
Freire's	work	 is	not	without	 its	 critics.	 Some	of	 its	 shortcom-
ings	Freire	(1994)	himself	acknowledged.	Indeed,	Bell	Hooks	(1993,	 
p.	152)	praises	Freire	for	his	“generous	spirit”	and	“open-minded-
ness”	in	the	face	of	criticism,	much	of	which	is	addressed	in	his	later	
writing or dialogues.
It is contended that some criticisms can be attributed to poor schol-
arship and consequently educators who “domesticate” Freire's overall 
theory	 and	 intent	 (Glass,	 2001;	McLaren	 &	 Leonard,	 1993),	 using	 it	
instead	as	a	method	 (Au,	2009)	 in	a	spontaneous	and	uncritical	way.	
Similarly,	Au	(2009)	suggests	that	the	difficulties	that	some	educators	
have	had	in	using	Freire's	work	in	different	contexts	are	probably	due	
to	the	existence	of	fundamental	differences	in	epistemological	stances,	
e.g.	whether	the	material	world	 is	something	that	can	be	known	and	
understood,	leading	to	failed	attempts	to	apply	the	theory.
Criticisms include the following:
•	 The	 type	of	 language	used	 (Ohliger,	 1995),	which	has	 been	de-
scribed	 as	 “pompous,	 inaccessible,	 elitist	 and	 portentous”	
(Hendricks	 ,	n.d.,	p.	3);	and	also	discriminatory	as	highlighted	by	
Au	(2009)	who	comments	on	the	universal	use	of	the	term	“man”
•	 That	his	work	is	too	simplistic,	in	the	sense	that	his	focus	on	class	
struggle	 excluded	other	 forms	of	 oppression,	 such	 as	 those	 as-
sociated	with	 gender	 and	 race,	 although	Au	 (2009)	 argues	 that	
Freire believed that discussion and theorizing could apply across 
different contexts and all forms of oppression as represented by 
my	research	with	nurses,	based	on	an	assumption	that	nurses	are	
considered	to	be	oppressed	due	to	both	sex	and	class	(Whitehead,	
2010).	Hendricks	(n.d.,	p.	3)	also	contests	that	critics	such	as	Diane	
Coben suggest that Freire's focus on class fails to recognize the 
“multifaceted and contradictory nature of differential power rela-
tionships.”	By	using	a	dualistic	role	definition,	the	oppressed	and	
the	oppressor,	Hendricks	(n.d.)	argues	that	there	is	a	danger	that	
the complexity of power and domination within simultaneous and 
interconnected	 identities	 might	 be	 overlooked.	 For	 example,	 a	
female director of nursing may be perceived by nurses to be in 
a	position	of	power,	but	 suffer	oppression	 in	 the	 face	of	an	all-
male	Trust	board,	which	impacts	on	the	ways	in	which	she	feels	
able	to	work.	The	bipolar	nature	of	Freire's	theory	is	also	criticised	
by	Taylor	 (1993,	p.	54),	questioning	why	Freire	 seems	 to	 ignore	
the	“central	canopy	of	life	where	most	people	live”:	lack	of	clarity,	
flawed	theorizing	and	truth	assumptions	(Galloway,	2012;	Glass,	
2001;	 Taylor,	 1993);	 and	 unclear	 ontology	 and	 epistemology	 as	
highlighted	in	debates	such	as	Mackie	(1988).	It	could	be	argued	
that	the	lack	of	clarity	is	not	surprising,	bearing	in	mind	the	eclec-
tic mix of philosophies and theories that Freire draws upon.
Yet	 despite	 these	 criticisms,	 Freire's	work	 continues	 to	 be	 de-
bated and his ideas used to inform liberatory education and com-
munity development across the world. Whilst I accept the criticisms 
outlined	above,	and	recognize	that	these	create	limitations	in	Freire's	
thinking,	I	still	believe	that	they	are	sufficiently	coherent	and	robust	
to inform my research.
By	engaging	in	a	detailed	study	of	Freire's	key	concepts:	consci-
entization and critical consciousness; praxis—a dialogical process of re-
flection and action; and power and knowledge,	I	was	able	to	identify	
a number of theoretical perspectives that I thought would underpin 
my research (see Table 1).
4  | E XPLOR ATION OF THE REL ATIONSHIP 
BET WEEN HUMAN BEINGS AND PERSONS
Key	 to	 undertaking	 research	 that	 is	 person-centred	 is	 the	 ability	
to articulate a clear philosophical position relating to the question: 
“What	is	a	person?”	My	opening	stance	seemed	simple	enough;	I	be-
lieve that all human beings are persons. This is because I believe that 
all human beings/persons are of equal value and therefore should be 
treated	with	equal	respect.	However,	it	was	at	this	point	that	I	rec-
ognized that whilst the terms “human beings” and “persons” might 
be	 used	 interchangeably,	 philosophically	 there	 are	many	 differing	
perspectives. I began to question whether Freire's use of the term 
“human	being”	(Freire,	2000)	related	to	my	understanding	of	what	a	
person	is.	To	answer	this	question,	I	had	to	explore	my	own	ontology	
and then to compare this in the light of Freire's philosophical ideas 
as	I	currently	appreciated	them.	The	process	of	trying	to	make	sense	
of	and	articulate	my	understanding	of	persons	and	personhood,	and	
compare that with Freire's perspective on humanity was not a simple 
one. This is perhaps not surprising as the philosophical debates on 
humanness	and	personhood	have	a	very	long	history,	going	back	as	
far	as	Socrates	in	the	4th	century	BC	(Torchia,	2008).	These	debates	
continue today with many differences of opinion: differences that 
are	acknowledged	by	Trigg	 (cited	 in	Torchia,	2008,	p	1)	who	high-
lights	 some	 of	 the	 opposing	 viewpoints,	 from	 considering	 human	
beings as one of many animal species influenced by evolutionary his-
tory at one extreme to persons who are the “special creation” of God 
at the other.
It is not the intention of this article to provide a complete sum-
mary	on	this	literature.	Instead,	it	will	demonstrate	how	the	pro-
cess	 of	 reading,	 rereading	 and	writing	 enabled	me	 to	 clarify	my	
TA B L E  1   Original theoretical principles arising from Freire's 
work
Humanization	as	an	ontological	vocation
The world and mind in a constant state of becoming
Reality	can	be	known,	but	not	in	a	singular	way
Knowledge	of	reality	facilitates	transformation	of	reality
Praxis as a dialectal dance (reflection and action; subject and object; 
subject to subject)
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values,	 beliefs	 and	 assumptions	 about	what	 a	 person	 is,	 so	 that	
I	could	critique	Freire's	thinking	in	relation	to	human	nature,	and	
ultimately	 reflect	 on	 my	 original	 theoretical	 principles,	 to	 iden-
tify and attend to any perceived gaps or inadequacies. Through 
the	 reading	and	writing	process,	 three	headings	emerged,	which	
helped me to frame and articulate my understandings: Our species: 
human beings; The kind that we are: human nature; and This person 
that I am: personhood.
5  | OUR SPECIES:  HUMAN BEINGS
It was through consideration of human beings as a species in the 
natural world that I became aware of my belief that we are embodied 
beings.	Scruton	(2013,	2017)	argues	that	we	are	animals,	we	have	a	
biology	and	we	are	part	of	the	natural	world	like	other	animals	and	
plants.	As	such,	the	physical	body	is	governed	by	natural	laws	that	
can be studied through physiological investigation and explained in 
causal	terms.	Whilst	I	believe	that	this	is	true,	I	recognize	that	there	
is	a	danger	in	just	thinking	about	human	beings	in	terms	of	the	physi-
cal	and	material	nature	of	our	bodies,	potentially	as	objects.	In	the	
view	of	Johnson	(2008),	such	a	perspective	could	lead	to	the	percep-
tion	that	the	physical	body	is	a	container	for	the	mind,	rather	than	a	
phenomenal body in which the mind is thoroughly embodied.
In	agreement	with	Scruton	 (2013),	 I	believe	 that	biological	 sci-
ence does not give us the whole truth about human nature because 
we live in the world in a different way to all other animals. I found 
that	 I	was	 intuitively	 drawn	 to	 the	work	 of	Mark	 Johnson	 (2007),	
which is underpinned by John Dewey's principle of continuity 
(1938/1991	cited	 in	Johnson,	2008,	p.	10)	and	draws	on	phenom-
enology	 and	 cognitive	 sciences,	 to	 seek	 an	 understanding	 of	 how	
humans,	 as	 biological	 beings,	 develop	meaning	 through	 embodied	
engagement	with	their	environments.	Accordingly,	 in	keeping	with	
Johnson	(2007),	I	would	argue	that	the	difference	between	human	
beings and animals is a consequence of the development of “higher” 
cognitive	processes	that	enable	us	to	explore,	critique	and	transform	
our	experiences	(Johnson,	2007).	This	development	is	a	result	of	nat-
ural	or	evolutionary	processes,	rather	than	the	work	of	an	“outside	
force”	(Dewey	1938/1991,	p.	30	cited	in	Johnson,	2007,	p.	10).
6  | THE KIND THAT WE ARE: HUMAN 
NATURE
As	 already	 suggested,	 in	 agreement	 with	 Torchia	 (2008),	 Scruton	
(2017)	 and	 indeed	 Freire	 (2000),	 recognizing	 our	 “human	 nature”	
is accepting that there is something distinct about our humanness. 
But	I	also	acknowledge	that	this	distinctiveness	can	in	some	cases	
be	 blurred,	 something	 that	 I	would	 now	 attribute	 to	 the	 principle	
of	continuity.	For	example,	there	are	many	similarities	between	the	
nurturing	 behaviours	 of	 humans	 and	 apes.	 However,	 my	 concern	
within the context of my research is not whether nonhumans should 
be	 considered	 to	 be	 persons,	 but	 that	 all	 humans	 are	 considered	
persons. I therefore decided that I did not need to consider the moral 
or ethical debates that are associated with discussions about hier-
archies	of	attributes	 (e.g.	McCormack	&	McCance,	2010).	 Instead,	
I	 decided	 to	 explore	 the	 idea	 of	 “human	 nature,”	 thinking	 instead	
about	the	ways	in	which	we,	as	human	beings,	live	in	the	world.	This	
meant	looking	beyond	just	the	biological,	to	discover	all	the	things	
that	we	share	(potential	or	actual)	as	part	of	our	human	nature,	e.g.	
social,	emotional,	rational,	moral,	historical	and	cultural.	To	achieve	
this,	I	returned	to	Freire	(2000),	to	reflect	on	how	he	defined	human	
nature—the	kind	that	we	are	and	the	things	that	we	share,	which	led	
me to consider an alternative perspective.
According	 to	 Harris	 (2011),	 there	 is	 very	 limited	 literature	 on	
Freire's philosophy of human nature. I therefore reread Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed	 (2000),	 searching	 for	 text	 that	provided	 insight	 into	
his	perspective.	Having	identified	what	I	perceived	to	be	significant	
text,	I	created	a	summary	to	capture	his	key	ideas	and	the	meanings	
that	I	draw	from	them	(see	Box	1).
Reflecting on Freire's perspective on human nature proved sig-
nificant. This was because it forced me to reflect on my ontologi-
cal beliefs as I experienced discomfort as I faced the recognition of 
Freire's apparent belief in cognitive rationality. I consequently had to 
consider how this perspective fitted (or not) with my research ques-
tions and the understanding that I was developing about muchness 
as a subjective experience. What follows is an overview of my un-
derstanding	of	dualism	in	the	light	of	Freire's	view	of	human	nature,	
which led me to consider our understanding of being in the world.
6.1 | The primacy of the mind
Reflecting	on	the	summary	in	Box	1,	I	believe	that	Freire's	perspec-
tive	of	human	nature	was	that	ontologically	and	epistemologically,	
human beings engage with and understand the world primarily in 
a cognitive way. This is because he emphasizes the importance of 
rationality,	 consciousness,	 reflection	 and	 the	use	of	 language,	 etc.	
No	overt	attention	is	paid	to	the	body	and	how	it	might	contribute	
to experience and meaning. It could be argued that this should not 
be	surprising,	as	the	emphasis	of	rational	discourse	is	something	that	
has	been	attributed	to	the	male-dominated	critical	social	theorists.
This view resonates with a dualist or Cartesian worldview. 
Dualism	can	be	traced	back	as	far	as	Plato	(Torchia,	2008),	placing	
primacy on the mind over the body. The body in everyday life is 
taken	for	granted,	seen	as	a	“house”	(Barbour,	2004,	p.	226)	or	even	a	
“betrayal	or	prison”	(Grosz,	1994,	p.	5	cited	in	McDonald	&	McIntyre,	
2001,	 p.	 236)	 for	 the	 soul	 (if	 you	believe	we	have	one),	mind	 and	
person.	This	separation	was	further	theorized	by	Descartes,	who	fa-
mously	states:	“I	think	therefore	I	am”	(Descartes,	1968,	p.	53,	cited	
in	Barbour,	2004,	p.	228).	In	essence,	Torchia	(2008)	suggests	that	in	
this	view,	what	is	essentially	human	is	confined	to	the	mind,	with	any	
claim to individuality or personhood also being rooted here.
The	primacy	of	the	mind,	based	on	Cartesian	philosophy,	has	un-
derpinned	Westernized	values	for	many	years.	Typically,	this	masculin-
ized perspective views men as those who are capable of using rational 
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(impartial,	 detached	 and	 objective)	 methods	 to	 determine	 truth	 and	
reality,	and	therefore	as	the	legitimate	holders	of	knowledge	(Barbour,	
2004).	 In	 this	 view,	Bordo	 (1987,	 cited	 in	Benner,	 2000)	 argues	 that	
thinking	is	completely	detached	from	emotion,	imagination	or	embod-
iment.	Similarly,	Barbour	 (2004)	posits	that	 in	this	worldview,	experi-
ence	is	not	considered	to	be	a	valid	form	of	knowledge	from	which	to	
establish	truth.	Instead,	the	knower	(subject)	and	the	known	(object)	are	
radically	separated	(Benner,	2000),	enabling	the	knower	to	create	inter-
nal	mental	representations	that	are	conscious,	and	can	be	articulated	as	
statements	of	“truth”	(Lakoff	&	Johnson,	1999,	cited	in	Benner,	2000).
This	latter	process	resonates	with	Harris’s	(2011)	belief	that	Freire's	
perspective	on	human	nature	was	largely	influenced	by	Erich	Kahler's	
idea	of	discernment;	 i.e.	 that	human	beings	 (unlike	animals)	have	 the	
ability	to	separate	from	and	to	objectify	the	world.	Hence,	they	are	able	
to identify the ways in which they can transcend limiting conditions 
towards achieving their ontological vocation of humanizing the world. 
However,	 it	 must	 be	 acknowledged	 that	 Freire	 did	 not	 believe	 that	
there were single truths as he recognized that social reality is constantly 
changing	(Taylor,	1993)	and	our	interpretations	of	it	will	be	influenced	
by	 our	 values,	 needs,	 interests	 and	 agendas	 (Mackie,	 1988;	 Powers,	
2015).	Freire	 (2000)	also	appreciated	the	 importance	of	experiences,	
or	existential	situations,	suggesting	that	these	should	be	represented	
through	visual,	graphic,	tactile	or	auditory	means	(codifications),	albeit	
as	“cognizable	objects”	to	stimulate	critical	reflection,	i.e.	thoughts	and	
actions.	However,	it	seems	likely	that	he	believed	that	these	situations	
were	experienced	primarily	through	the	mind,	rather	than	the	body.
6.2 | Embodiment: the body and mind are entwined
An	alternative	philosophical	perspective	to	dualism	and	cognitive	
rationality	has	been	offered	by	Merleau-Ponty,	who	was	strongly	
Box 1 A summary of Freire's philosophy on human nature
When	offering	an	overview	of	Freire's	perspective	of	being	human	beings,	Crotty	(1998,	p.	150)	suggests	that	“to	ask	who	human	be-
ings	are	or	what	it	means	to	be	human	is	to	ask	what	human	beings	have	made	of	themselves.”	I	understand	this	to	mean	that	human	
beings are therefore “beings for themselves,”	uncompleted	and	unfinished,	in	a	process	of	becoming	more	fully	human.
Freire argues that we can engage in this process because we are conscious beings who live in relation to the world and others. 
Freire	argues	that	human	beings	cannot	exist	without	a	“non-I,”	and	similarly,	the	“non-I”	is	dependent	upon	the	existence	of	the	
other.	Without	human	beings,	Freire	suggests	that	the	world	would	not	exist	because	there	would	be	no	one	to	call	it	the	world,	to	
be	conscious	of	it	and	to	construct	what	we	know	as	reality.	Here,	Freire	is	acknowledging	the	importance	of	the “word.” Dialogue is 
indispensable	to	the	cognitive	act	of	unveiling	reality,	as	Freire	believed	that	it	was	essential	to	name	the	world	to	be	able	to	change	
it. Consciousness is therefore brought into existence through our relationship with the world. This is not something that we do alone 
as	we	are	social	beings.	Consequently,	we	also	live	in	relationship	with	others.	I	make	sense	of	Freire's	view	on	the	existence	of	the	
world	by	drawing	on	Humphreys	(1993,	p.	17,	cited	in	Crotty,	1998,	p.	43),	who	describes	the	world	in	the	absence	of	human	beings	
as being full of “worldstuff”; such worldstuff exists but not as meaningful realities.
Freedom	is	also	a	necessary	condition	for	humans	to	continuously	strive	towards	completion.	My	understanding	of	Freire's	use	of	the	
term	freedom	is	that	it	is	the	ability	to	make	your	own	decisions,	to	create	and	transform	ourselves	and	reality;	not	only	materially	
but	also	in	terms	of	who	we	are	and	how	we	live.	However,	Freire	also	acknowledges	that	freedom	can	also	be	associated	with	fear	
(for	both	the	oppressed	and	oppressors),	as	the	authentic	existence	that	is	connected	with	freedom	comes	not	only	with	autonomy 
but also with responsibility.
Freire argues that human beings are able to strive towards completion because they can critically confront self and reality. They can 
perceive	the	way	they	exist	in	the	world	with	which	and	in	which	they	find	themselves,	critically	reflecting	on	the	dialectical	relation-
ship between themselves as subjective beings and their concrete historical and cultural reality.
Freire believes that praxis (reflection and action) is an innate ability that enables human beings to transcend beyond situations that 
may	limit	them	from	being	more	fully	human	.	By	objectifying	the	world	in	order	to	understand	it,	human	beings	are	then	able	to	make	
decisions,	in	relationship	with	the	world	and	others,	transforming	it	through	their	actions.	In	this	way,	an	individual	is	a	re-creator	of	
self	and	the	world:	both	of	which	are	incomplete	and	both	of	which	are	historical.	My	reading	of	this	is	that	Freire	believes	that	we	
have a creative	nature	because	not	only	are	we	able	to	critically	reflect	on	situations,	we	are	also	able	to	imagine	how	things	could	be	
different.	Whilst	praxis	might	be	an	innate	ability,	it	is	something	that	can	be	suppressed	(by	oppressive	practices)	but	also	facilitated	
(by liberatory educators).
Freire suggests that fulfilment	 is	achieved,	only	to	the	extent	that	human	beings	are	able	to	create	their	world—a	world	that	is	a	
human	world.	This	acknowledges	his	belief	that	human	beings	are	not	meant	to	adapt,	but	to	shape	the	very	conditions	of	their	
existence.
My	understanding	of	becoming	more	fully	human	being	is	that	in	praxis,	human	beings	are	able	to	reflect	and	act	on	those	situations	
that limit them from transforming reality and creating their own history and culture. This is a continuous process.
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influenced	 by	 the	work	 of	 both	Husserl	 and	Heidegger.	 This	 al-
ternative	 viewpoint	 has	 acquired	 growing	 interest	 and	 support,	
particularly	over	the	last	four	decades	(Johnson,	2008).	Contrary	
to	mind	 and	body	dualism,	Merleau-Ponty	 suggested	 the	notion	
of	the	“body-subject,”	which	does	not	privilege	the	mind	and	cog-
nitive	 activity	 (Ray,	 2006).	 Instead,	 he	 asserts	 that	 we	 live	 and	
experience	 the	 world	 through	 our	 bodies,	 particularly	 through	
perception,	emotion,	language,	movement	in	space	and	time,	and	
sexuality	(Ray,	2006).	From	this	perspective,	Benner	(2000)	argues	
that the phenomenal body is the only means of being in the world. 
The	mind	and	body	are	entwined,	and	the	mind	is	always	embod-
ied	 (Barbour,	 2004).	 Embodiment	 is	 the	 existential	 condition	 of	
being	 in	 the	 world	 (McDonald	 &	McIntyre,	 2001)	 and	 receiving	
and	generating	knowledge	about	the	world	(Grosz,	1994,	cited	in	
McDonald	&	McIntyre,	2001).	Consciousness	is	therefore	embod-
ied	 consciousness	 (Benner,	 2000),	 and	 the	mind	 is	 an	 embodied	
mind	(Johnson,	2007).
I	have	found	Johnson’s	(2007,	2008)	work	of	particular	inter-
est	when	thinking	about	human	nature	and	relating	this	to	nurses	
and how they might experience muchness in and through their 
practice.	His	theory	is	underpinned	by	the	philosophical	ideas	of	
the	 American	 pragmatists,	 primarily	 not	 only	 John	 Dewey,	 but	
also	William	 James.	 Additionally,	 he	 draws	 on	 his	 own	work	 on	
metaphors	undertaken	with	George	Lakoff	(1980,	1999),	the	work	
of	 phenomenologists	 (e.g.	 Sheets-Johnstone,	 1999),	 and	 also	
cognitive	 neuroscientists	 (e.g.	 Damasio,	 1994;	 1999;	 2003),	 to	
provide naturalistic explanations for the ways in which meaning 
emerges	 from	our	 bodily	 engagement	with	 the	world.	Meaning,	
for	 Johnson	 (2007,	p.	10),	 is	 concerned	with	 “the	 character	 and	
significance	of	a	person's	 interactions	with	 their	environments,”	
which I assume also includes others within these environments. 
This seems of particular relevance to my research as I explore the 
nature of muchness and how it can be nurtured through experi-
ences	in	the	workplace.
My	 understanding	 of	 Johnson's	 theory	 of	 embodiment	 is	 that	
human	beings	 have	 a	 brain	 operating	 inside	 their	 bodies,	 and	 this	
body is engaged in a continual process of interaction with its en-
vironment. This continuity means that there is no duality between 
mind	and	body,	or	body	and	environment.	 It	also	 results	 in	a	con-
tinuous	flow	of	experience.	Human	meaning	is	relational	and	as	our	
bodies	 are	 in	 constant	 interaction	 with	 our	 world;	 consequently,	
meaning-making	is	ongoing.	Much	of	this	is	an	unconscious	process,	
undertaken	by	complex	and	intertwined	sensorimotor	systems	that	
protect	our	basic	bodily	functions,	safeguard	us	from	harm	and	also	
guide	us	towards	a	sense	of	well-being.	Johnson	describes	this	form	
of meaning as “immanent.” Within this continuous flow of experience 
and	meaning-making,	Damasio	(1994;	1999;	2003;	cited	in	Johnson,	
2007)	suggests	that	there	are	situations	that	require	transformative	
actions	to	maintain	or	re-establish	equilibrium.	These	will	come	to	
conscious	awareness	as	emotions	(complex	neural,	chemical	and	be-
havioural	 responses)	become	acknowledged	as	 feelings.	These	are	
feelings	 of	 “qualities,	 sensory	 patterns,	 movements,	 changes	 and	
emotional contours.” “Conscious” meaning therefore “depends upon 
us	 experiencing	 and	 assessing	 the	 quality	 of	 situations”	 (Johnson,	
2007,	p.	70).
Drawing	on	Dewey,	 Johnson	 (2007)	 argues	 that	 in	 its	deepest	
and	 richest	 sense,	 experience	 is	 a	 complexity	 of	 physical,	 biologi-
cal,	 social	 and	 cultural	 conditions.	Within	 this	 complexity,	we	 dis-
criminate	 certain	 qualities	 for	 further	 analysis.	 For	 example,	 we	
could become conscious of feeling that a situation is problematic 
(e.g.	 a	 lack	of	muchness	or	well-being	at	work)	and	 recognize	 that	
it requires further interpretation and explanation. It is through this 
analysis	process	that	objects,	properties	and	relations	emerge	as	we	
search for generalizations that can help with our understanding. This 
process of conceptualization is attributed to our neural capacity to 
discriminate	various	qualities,	but	unlike	a	dualist	perspective,	these	
objects	are	not	fixed	entities.	Instead,	they	emerge	from	our	bodily	
perceptual	experience.	As	 such,	 there	 is	no	ontological	 separation	
between	 emotion,	 feeling,	 perception,	 conceptualization,	 reason	
and action etc.
I	make	sense	of	Johnson's	perspective	on	the	mind	such	that	it	
is the bodily activity that enables us to engage in this higher form 
of	inquiry	about	our	experiences,	allowing	us	to	conceptualize,	re-
flect,	reason	and	action	plan.	There	are	no	identified	brain	or	body	
parts	that	can	be	identified	as	the	“mind”;	instead,	the	mind	is	the	
processes that evolve out of our “ongoing coupling with our envi-
ronment”	(Johnson,	2007,	p.	130);	processes	that	Damasio	(1994,	
p.	xvi,	cited	in	Johnson,	2007,	p.	99)	would	argue	are	neural.	This	is	
underpinned by the pragmatist assumption that all that we associ-
ate	with	the	mind	arises	from	this	ongoing	coupling,	and	from	the	
immanent	meaning	that	we	develop,	as	we	seek	“to	survive,	grow	
and	 flourish	 with	 in	 different	 kinds	 of	 environment”	 (Johnson,	
2007,	p.130).
So	far,	the	focus	has	been	on	an	individual	human	being	and	their	
engagement	with	their	world;	however,	Johnson	(2007)	is	clear	that	a	
large part of this interaction involves other human beings and that our 
thinking,	reasoning,	language	and	understanding	are	social.	Our	cogni-
tion	is	significantly	influenced	by	our	social	interactions	and	relations,	
as	well	as	cultural	artefacts	and	practices;	similarly,	 language	and	all	
other forms of symbolic expression are viewed as social behaviours. 
Johnson	(2008,	p.	164–166)	suggests	that	there	are	at	least	five	en-
twined dimensions of human embodiment: the biological body; the 
ecological body; the phenomenological body; the social body; and the 
cultural	body.	In	this	sense,	Johnson	(2007)	argues	that	the	mind,	i.e.	
perception,	feeling,	emotion,	reasoning	and	acting,	is	interfused	with	
our	embodiment,	shaping	what	and	who	we	are.
7  | CRE ATING MORE COMPLETE 
THEORETIC AL PRINCIPLES
At	this	stage,	it	was	important	to	reflect	on	Freire’s	(2000)	perspective	
on	human	nature,	in	the	light	of	Johnson’s	(2007,	2008)	viewpoint	as	
outlined	above,	to	identify	any	perceived	inadequacies	or	inconsisten-
cies	between	Freire's	theoretical	ideas,	the	theoretical	principles	that	
I	have	drawn	from	these,	and	my	ontological	beliefs	and	assumptions.
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7.1 | The world and mind in a constant 
state of becoming
Both	theories	suggest	that	human	beings	are	deeply	connected	to	
and	continuously	interacting	with	the	world/environment.	Similarly,	
both	agree	that	to	survive,	become	or	flourish,	adjustments	or	trans-
formations in the way we relate to our world and others need to be 
made. I believe the difference between them lies in the nature of this 
interaction. Freire proposes that this is primarily a cognitive relation-
ship;	whilst	Johnson	argues	that	it	is	an	embodied	relationship,	the	
“body–mind”	interacting	with	the	environment.
This difference therefore draws attention to Freire's pro-
cess of conscientization and the state of critical consciousness. 
Conscientization,	Freire	(2000)	argues,	relies	on	our	apparent	ability	
to	step	back	from	this	interaction,	and	critically	confront	ourselves	
and	reality	(discernment).	In	contrast,	Door	(2014)	argues	that	both	
Merleau-Ponty	and	Dewey	contend	that	humans	are	in	fact	unable	
to separate themselves from the world because: “The world is wholly 
inside	and	I	am	wholly	outside	of	myself”	(Merleau-Ponty,	1996,	p.	
407,	cited	in	Door,	2014,	p.	92).	Reality	is	therefore	not	something	
that	is	just	“out	there,”	full	of	external	concrete	objects	that	can	be	
mentally	represented.	Instead,	we	come	to	know	reality	through	our	
immanent	 and	 conscious	 meaning-making	 processes.	We	will	 dis-
criminate	objects,	properties	and	relations,	using	our	perceptual	and	
motor	abilities,	guided	by	our	interests,	history	and	values	(Johnson,	
2007).
7.2 | Knowledge of reality facilitates 
transformation of reality
Conscientization towards developing a state of critical conscious-
ness,	i.e.	an	awareness	of	the	factors	that	contribute	to	oppression,	
will therefore involve paying attention to the body as an important 
source	of	knowledge.	This	will	involve	critical	reflexivity	to	develop	
a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 our	 preconscious,	 embodied	 transac-
tions,	 and	 how	 these	might	 help	 or	 impede	 the	 humanization	 of	
self	and	others	(Door,	2014),	as	well	as	critiquing	the	socio-cultural	
world	to	determine	the	impositions	that	 it	makes	on	us	(Johnson,	
2015).
7.3 | Praxis as a dialectical dance
Freire (2000) asserts that conscientization and ultimately critical 
consciousness are achieved through the dialogical process of praxis. 
Being	able	 to	name	 the	world,	 i.e.	 the	 “word,”	 is	essential	 to	what	
Freire believes to be the cognitive act of unveiling reality so that 
it can be transformed by self and others through our/their actions. 
Whilst	Johnson	(2007)	would	not	dispute	the	value	of	language	as	a	
means of sharing and discussing our thoughts and arguments about 
the	 nature	 of	 reality,	 he	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 primacy	 of	 body-
based	and	intersubjective	meaning,	which	he	argues	emerges	from	
the	body–mind	interaction	with	the	environment	and	others,	 lead-
ing to thought and then word/language. This challenges the dualist 
perspective	 that	would	contest	 that	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	meaning	
belongs to words.
In	many	ways,	 Dewey's	 definition	 of	 human	 inquiry,	 as	 out-
lined	by	Johnson	(2007,	p.	105),	resonates	with	Freire's	notion	of	
praxis.	He	 states	 that	 human	 inquiry	 is	 “an	 embodied,	 situated,	
ongoing process that begins with a problematic or indeterminate 
situation,	employs	intelligence	and	symbolic	resources	of	thought	
to	 clarify	 and	 seek	 to	 resolve	 the	 tension	 in	 the	 situation,	 and,	
when	successful,	transforms	the	character	and	quality	of	the	sit-
uation.” What is missing from praxis is the recognition of embod-
iment. It seems that the body has been ignored or is invisible and 
experience	feels	like	it	is	a	story	to	be	told	rather	than	a	sophis-
ticated abstraction and conceptualization of our embodiment. 
Conversely,	 I	would	argue	what	 is	missing	 from	Dewey's	defini-
tion of human inquiry is dialogue.
In	 the	 light	 of	 the	 above	 discussion,	 I	 revisited	 and	 amended	
some of my theoretical principles. These are outlined in Table 2 
below.
8  | THIS PERSON THAT I  AM: 
PERSONHOOD
At	the	beginning	of	the	article,	I	identified	the	need	to	explore	the	
relationship between Freire's use of the term “human being” and my 
understanding	of	what	is	a	person,	and	it	is	this	that	I	now	turn	my	
attention to. This is not an issue that either Freire (2000) or Johnson 
Original principle Amended	principle
Humanization	as	an	ontological	vocation  
The world and mind in a constant state of 
becoming
The	body–mind	and	world	in	a	constant	state	of	
becoming
Reality	can	be	known	but	not	in	a	singular	
way
 
Knowledge	of	reality	facilitates	
transformation of reality
Experience-based	and	embodied	knowledge	of	
reality facilitates transformation of reality
Praxis as a dialectical dance (reflection 
and	action,	subject	and	object,	subject	
and subject)
Praxis as a dialectical dance (reflection and 
action,	body–mind	and	environment,	subject	
and subject)
TA B L E  2  Amended	theoretical	
principles
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(2007)	paid	explicit	attention	to;	instead,	they	seemed	to	use	the	two	
terms (human being and person) interchangeably.
Through my encounter with and exploration of the vast lit-
erature and debates surrounding the question of “what does it 
mean	to	be	a	person?,”	I	was	able	to	further	develop	my	ontologi-
cal	understanding	and	critique	Freire's	perspectives,	in	a	way	that	
enabled me to finalize the theoretical principles that would ulti-
mately inform the development of my methodology and methods 
with the ultimate purpose of helping me to explore my research 
questions.
8.1 | What does it mean to be a person?
I	 believe	 that	 a	 person	 is	 a	 biological	 being,	 part	 of	 the	 natural	
world	like	other	animals	and	plants;	an	individual	member	of	the	
human	species.	We	are	embodied	beings,	constantly	 interacting	
and engaging with our environment and other embodied beings 
(Johnson,	2007).	Our	bodies	are	separate	from	one	another,	and	
therefore,	we	experience	 the	world	 in	 a	unique	way,	 as	 individ-
ual subjects. This unique experience of “being in the world” ul-
timately	 influences	who	we	are	 (McCormack	&	McCance,	2010;	
Medlock,	2012).	A	key	element	of	this	is	our	relational	existence.	
Our embodied engagement with the social world means that our 
being	 as	 persons	 continually	 evolves	 (McCormack	 &	 McCance,	
2010),	 as	 we	 open	 ourselves	 up	 to	 the	 perspective	 of	 others	
through	ongoing	social	interactions	(Medlock,	2012).	This	means	
therefore	that	we	are	always	becoming,	never	finished	and	always	
incomplete	in	some	way	(Freire,	2000).	It	is	through	this	process	
Cassell	 (1982,	 cited	 in	 Dewing,	 2008)	 would	 argue	 that	 human	
beings are able to develop a full sense of being a person. It is this 
sense	that	I	understand	the	meaning	of	personhood.	McCormack	
and	McCance	 (2017)	 cite	 Liebing	 (2008,	 p.	 180)	 when	 defining	
personhood,	 stating	 that	 it	 is	 “that	 which	 really	 matters”	 to	 us	
that	guides	us.	This	really	resonates	with	Medlock’s	(2012)	ideas	
about	 the	 “authentic	 self,”	 recognizing	 the	 importance	 of	 one's	
value orientation and the possibility of pursuing a life path that is 
consistent with these.
Dewing	 (2008,	p.	5)	quotes	 the	poet	W.	H.	Auden	 (which	was	
originally	cited	in	van	Manen,	1997,	p.	6),	to	suggest	that	when	we	
refer	to	“persons,”	we	are	referring	“to	the	uniqueness	of	each	human	
being.” I am drawn to the way in which this uniqueness is captured 
over	the	lifespan	by	Selder	(1989,	cited	in	McCormack	&	McCance,	
2010) as “the tapestry of one's life.”	McCormack	and	McCance	(2010,	
p.	14)	summarize	this	as:
A person’s reality refers to the everyday world. It is im-
bued with personal meanings, beliefs and values which 
are essential to the way the persons ‘sees’ themselves and 
the way the world is constructed. Whilst many aspects 
of an individual’s reality may be shared with others so 
that common understandings can exist in order to form 
a sense of community, it is the individuality of personal 
meanings that determines ‘who I am’. It is the rich tapes-
try of meaning that creates the foundation on which the 
structures of one’s life are built.
It is this uniqueness and individuality that I believe is missing from 
Freire’s	(2000)	theory,	when	thinking	about	my	research.	In	line	with	
other	critical	social	theorists,	he	focuses	on	the	collective,	specifically	
the	 “oppressed”	 (and	 the	 “oppressors”),	 i.e.	 social	groups	 that	he	 re-
gards as homogenous types. Whilst my research aims to develop some 
common	understandings	that	hopefully	can	be	shared,	 I	believe	that	
person-centred	research	must	always	also	acknowledge	the	rich	and	
unique	tapestries	of	the	participants	and	co-researchers.
Such a definition of a person does not put any conditions on 
which members of the human species are considered to be per-
sons. This fits with my opening stance; all human beings are per-
sons.	Associated	with	 this,	 I	 align	myself	with	 the	Kantian	belief,	
or	 categorical	 imperative,	 that	 all	 persons	 have	 intrinsic	 worth	
and	dignity,	and	should	always	be	treated	as	an	end	in	themselves	
(McCormack	et	al.,	2017;	McCormack	&	McCance,	2010).	This	view	
I	argue	resonates	with	Freire’s	(2000)	theory,	as	his	underlying	as-
sumption was that it is every human being's ontological vocation 
to	be	a	“subject,”	or	a	person,	who	is	able	to	continuously	act	upon	
their	world,	 to	become.	To	 realize	 this,	we	need	 to	call	 upon	 the	
intrinsic	moral	good	of	persons,	as	a	means	of	making	ethical	deci-
sions	about	what	is	“right”	or	“good”	in	a	certain	situation	(Medlock,	
2012). Freire (2000) argues that freedom is a necessary condition 
for	 humans	 to	 continuously	 strive	 towards	 completion;	 however,	
this	 autonomy	 to	make	 decisions	 also	 comes	with	 responsibility.	
This includes having and acting upon an ethical value orientation 
towards what it means to be a good person and live a good life 
(MacIntyre,	1984;	Taylor,	1989).
Having	asserted	that	all	human	beings	are	persons,	that	persons	
are	unique	individuals,	who	should	be	considered	intrinsically	valu-
able,	 I	 conclude	 that	person-centredness	 is	 therefore	not	only	 the	
recognition	of	this	uniqueness	but	also	the	promotion	of	autonomy,	
responsibility	and	dignity,	 through	 the	development	and	nurturing	
of	 healthful	 relationships	 (McCormack	 et	 al.,	 2017)	 and	 manifest	
within	culture.	It	is	underpinned	by	the	values	of	respect,	reciprocity,	
mutuality	 and	 self-determination	 (McCormack	&	McCance,	 2010).	
Person-centredness	was	therefore	added	to	complete	my	theoreti-
cal principles (see Table 3).
TA B L E  3   Final theoretical principles
Humanization	as	an	ontological	vocation
The	body–mind	and	world	in	a	constant	state	of	becoming	
personhood
Person-centredness
Reality	can	be	known	but	not	in	a	singular	way
Experience-based	and	embodied	knowledge	of	reality	facilitates	
transformation of reality
Praxis	as	a	dialectical	dance	(reflection	and	action,	body–mind	and	
environment,	subject	and	subject)
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9  | CONCLUSION
This article presents a critique of Paulo Freire's philosophical per-
spective on human nature in the context of a doctoral research 
study to explore “muchness” or nurses’ subjective experience of 
well-being.	 This	 process	 of	 exploration	 was	 essential	 to	 ensure	
that I gained clarity about my ontological beliefs relating to the 
nature of human beings and persons. This ensured that there was 
coherence with the theoretical principles that I drew from Freire’s 
(2000)	work.
Through	 this	 critique,	 I	 recognized	 that	 Freire's	 perspective	 on	
human	 nature	 foregrounded	 cognitive	 rationality,	 which	 presented	
itself as a limitation when considering my ontological beliefs and the 
focus of my research; and focused on the “collective” rather than indi-
viduals,	which	is	a	shortcoming	in	relation	to	person-centred	research	
that	 acknowledges	 the	 uniqueness	 of	 participants.	 Acknowledging	
these limitations enabled me to draw upon wider philosophical per-
spectives	 around	 embodiment	 and	 person-centredness	 to	 develop	
more complete theoretical principles to underpin the development of 
my research methodology and methods. These will inform the ways 
in	which	I	work	with	nurses,	as	participants	and	co-researchers,	to	ex-
plore the concept of muchness in nursing; the factors that enable their 
subjective	experiences	of	well-being;	and	how	muchness	contributes	
to	the	development	of	person-centred	cultures.
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